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ABSTRACT
Increasingly complex malware continues to evade detection, stealing informa-
tion, taking systems oﬄine, and disrupting functionality of many computer
systems. Traditional techniques have not adequately protected systems from
attackers, and the most commonly used detection techniques overlook the
contents of memory.
Modern systems contain a wealth of information in the contents of mem-
ory, but making use of that information is anything but trivial. There are
a number of challenges related to both the acquisition and analysis of a sys-
tem’s memory. Many forensic situations could involve machines in hostile
environments, and many acquisition techniques result in artifacts, which re-
duce the fidelity of the image and hinder the analysis phase. Although the
kernel memory space has come a long way in being mapped, the state of
application memory has largely been unexplored.
We have created a toolset that extracts the application’s context from the
structure of pointers in a sample of that application’s memory. This context
allows us to perform statistical analysis, visualize the structure of memory,
and provides a new way to train classifiers.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In June 2010, the company VirusBlokAda [1] discovered a piece of malware
which later came to be known as Stuxnet [9]. In addition to being one of the
largest and most complex pieces of malware ever written, it was also one of
the first discovered piece of malware to specifically target industrial control
systems. While it was initially believed to have been active for only a few
months, it was later found that variants had been active for over a year. If
not for an error introduced in an update, which accidentally caused it to
spread outside of the intended systems, it likely could have gone undetected
for a significantly longer period of time. Stuxnet demonstrated for the first
time that there were entities interested in writing extremely complex and
sophisticated malware, and in the light of these sophisticated rootkits, current
tools and techniques simply were not up to par.
The sophistication of Stuxnet was immense. Unlike traditional malware,
it was designed to only affect very specific system configurations. The goal of
Stuxnet’s developers appears to be to damage the Iranian nuclear program,
and the end target of Stuxnet appears to have been to damage the uranium
centrifuges. In order to achieve these goals, many layers of software were
required, including the first ever PLC rootkit. Stuxnet would infect the Step7
software to inject malicious code onto the PLC’s controlling the centrifuges.
This attack is even more impressive when one considers that much of the
infrastructure targeted by Stuxnet was in an isolated network, which was not
connected to the Internet. Despite being in a controlled environment, the
attack was successful in propagating through the Iranian systems, heavily
relying on the use of USB thumb drives. If an attack could flourish in such
a tightly controlled environment, one could imagine the vulnerabilities that
would exist in a more conventional environment.
The majority of popular anti-malware tools are online, that is they execute
in the environment of a running system. While this has traditionally been
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sufficient, advancements on the malware side, such as rootkits have signifi-
cantly reduced the effectiveness of online-anti-malware tools. Modern mal-
ware, even examples far less sophisticated than Stuxnet, have become very
good at hiding their identity. Sophisticated anti-anti-malware techniques
have allowed malware to evade or disable conventional malware techniques.
While the majority of forensic use cases are likely on systems controlled by
those doing forensics, forensic techniques are also useful in hostile contexts.
In the case where the FBI or another agency were trying to get information
from an adversarial system, many of the underlying assumptions a conven-
tional forensic analyst would make would be invalid.
Recent works, such as Forenscope [13] have allowed for malware analysis
outside of the context of a running system. While this circumvents the
anti-anti-malware techniques employed by advanced malware, Forenscope
does disable a systems functionality for the duration it runs. The authors
addressed this by demonstrating that one of the ideal uses of Forenscope
would be to capture memory dumps instead of doing analysis on the spot.
The ability to split the forensic process to separate acquisition and anal-
ysis was not new. Traditional techniques involved other means to capture
a memory dump. Use of the unix tool dd, actually seemed to be the most
common practice, but unlike Forenscope, dd could be subverted by malware
and also left artifacts in the dumped memory. There are many unique chal-
lenges related to the memory acquisition process, which are discussed in this
thesis.
With access to a memory dump, the obvious next step is to analyze the
kernel and applications running at the time of the dump. Traditionally,
memory dump analysis was a tedious manual process, relying only on the
aid of simple tools that searched for strings in the memory dump. In time,
tools began to become much more comprehensive in aiding this process.
While memory dump analysis has begun to do a thorough job analyzing the
contents of memory related to the kernel [6], little has been done to explore
the application space.
Sophisticated malware, such as Stuxnet, can include a number of rootkits,
many of which exist outside the kernel space. As the current state of the
art is lacking in this domain, we developed a tool which can extract some
basic application context from the memory dump. This context contains a
numerical analysis of the pointers in memory and allows for visualization of
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those pointers structure. If this context were to be mined and stored, memory
dumps could be checked against the stored copies from trusted copies of the
applications in order to search malicious modifications. For example, the
complex modifications Stuxnet made to the Step7 software would certainly
have changed the application memory structure significantly. This type of
infection would be an ideal to identify with our tool.
Building off of volatility, which provides process ids, and memory offsets
to the start of heap and stack data, we have created a tool to analyze and
visualize application data in the heap. It provides a variety of numbers
related to the pointer structure and pages in addition to the visualization.
The visualization shows the actual connections between each pointer, which
provides an intuitive way to reason about the structures of the heap.
We run our tool on the Chromium web browser and observe considerable
differences in the memory objects found in dumps of Chromium in different
states.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Forensics
The term forensics originates from the Latin word forensis, which means
of or before the forum. Forensics has predated computers by hundreds of
years, but many of the ideals remain the same. Physical processes, evidence
collection, analysis, etc all have corollaries in digital forensics.
Digital forensics is modern extension of the much broader field of forensics.
The term digital forensics has been used in a wide variety of contexts between
legal, technical, and common audiences, but for this paper we will use this
definition: Tools and techniques to recover, preserve, and examine digital
evidence on or transmitted by digital devices.
2.2 Forensic Process
While there are published standards, such as the Electronic Crime Scene
Investigation Guide [2] by the National Institute of Justice, it is important
to consider that digital forensics is used in a variety of instances beyond that
of crime. That being said, the Electronic Crime Scene Investigation Guide
provides a good baseline for which we can compare. It outlines the following
four main stages of the forensic process:
• Collection (referred to as acquisition) - The first stage of the forensic
process. The goal is to find, document, and collect or duplicate as much
evidence as possible.
• Examination - Discover the relevant items from those collection, doc-
umenting their origin and significance. Digital evidence often contains
incredible quantities of information, and a critical part of examination
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is the discovery of the relevant pieces of information, which is often
akin to finding a needle in a haystack.
• Analysis - Finding the significance of the evidence uncovered in exam-
ination and its probative value to the case.
• Reporting - Documentation of not only the points of evidence, but the
process and validity of the other stages of the forensic process.
There are other important parts of the forensic process as well. The contin-
ued development of tools is invaluable to aiding the stages listed above. It is
also important to note that outside of the legal process, different focuses will
change how the forensic process is applied. In the case of a company respond-
ing to an attack, they are likely be much more concerned about minimizing
damage, repairing the affected systems, and preventing further incidents in-
stead of focusing on attribution and validity of their methods. As a result,
the methodology can differ considerably between these situations. Also, in
practice, many tools can span both the examination and the analysis phases,
both finding and analyzing data. There are many other topics of digital
forensics, related to these processes, the legal system, scientific approaches,
etc, but these are outside the scope of this thesis.
2.3 Types of Digital Forensics
Digital forensics spans a large number of different types of data. Tradition-
ally, digital forensics was performed by shutting down and collecting digital
devices. This process is often referred to as dead box forensics. This refers
to the fact the system isnt running while (parts of) collection, examination,
and analysis are being performed. With the evidence contained in network
traffic and encrypted drives being unavailable to deadbox forensics, modern
trends have been favoring live forensics. In live forensics, machines are kept
online in order to collect this otherwise unavailable evidence. Live forensics
allows for network information to be recorded, intercepted, and explored in
other fashions, the recovery of data on mounted encrypted drives, volatile
memory extraction, and other evidence which would be lost doing deadbox
forensics.
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2.3.1 Disk Forensics
Disk forensics is the classic deadbox forensic technique. It is quite simple
to search unencrypted disks for a variety of information. The structures the
disk and operating system use to organize data can be leveraged to quickly
find files, metadata, and other forensic information. More exotic information
is also available, such as deleted files, paged memory, hibernation files, and
more, but these types of information cant be expected. While disk forensics
was a great start to digital forensics, additional types of data are important
to paint a complete picture of the situation.
Network Forensics
Network forensics is in short, the collection and analysis of network traffic.
This includes both wired and wireless communications and due to the tran-
sient nature of network traffic, is short lived and volatile. Unlike disk foren-
sics, network forensic information typically isnt available after an incident,
so acquisition has to be proactive instead of reactive. Many types of mal-
ware use the network for propagation, and detection via intrusion detection
systems analyzing network traffic is often how new malware are discovered.
2.3.2 Memory Forensics
Memory forensics is the branch of digital forensics exploring the contents of a
machines volatile memory (typically DRAM and SRAM). There is a wealth
of information in volatile memory, ranging from modifications to kernel data
structures, to network sockets, to encryption keys which could unlock other-
wise useless disks.
While many aspects of memory forensics are similar to all branches of
digital forensics, there are a variety of factors which make it a difficult and
interesting challenge to do.
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CHAPTER 3
CHALLENGES IN MEMORY FORENSICS
There are many unique situations, all which warrant the consideration of
volatile memory forensics. Many cases pose unique challenges to both the
acquisition and analysis phases of memory forensics.
3.1 Acquisition
3.1.1 Memory Quality
The quality of a memory dump is one of the simplest ways to reason about
the quality of an acquisition technique. A perfect memory dump would be
identical to the entirety of memory at one point in time. While this ideal is
attainable, it is often not fully realized due to many factors in acquisition.
The two main factors of memory quality are taint and blurriness.
Taint
When an application, an agent, a buffer, or any component of an acquisition
tool uses memory of the machine, that memory use disrupts the capture of
a perfect quality memory image. One of the most common (albeit generally
pretty crude) ways to capture volatile memory is to use the unix application
dd to do a block by block copy of memory from /dev/mem. The use of dd
is very popular due to the fact that it is extremely simple to use, captures a
decent fidelity image of memory, and is already installed on many systems.
The tool provides a great example of taint in a forensic system. It requires
memory for the application itself (although quite small), but the memory
used for page caching (used to write to disk) can add up to a considerable
amount.
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Blurriness
Many tools capture memory in a running system. An ideal dump of memory
would be from one instance of time. Unfortunately, without the ability to
pause the system, the machine will continue to run, so blocks of the dump
will be from different time intervals. For example, a tool (such as dd) copies
memory 4mb at a time each second to a thumb drive, so the first 4mb are
from a time of 0 sec, the second 4mb are from a time of 1 sec, third... 2sec,
etc. While many of these blocks will be identical across the time intervals,
many blocks will also change. As a result of this pointers will (incorrectly)
point to invalid locations, data spanning blocks will be incoherent or lost,
and data that was moved to a block that had already been copied wouldnt
be found in the dump. The more actively the system is writing to memory,
the more significant the effects of blurriness.
3.1.2 Hostile Context
Many examples of malware include components which either passively or ac-
tively hide their existence. This includes simple obfuscation such as modifi-
cation of applications which display files or running programs as well as more
complex mechanisms such as hooking into system calls to extreme examples,
utilizing firmware and external hardware to aid in obfuscation. Again, dd
poses a great example of a tool, which despite its common use, has issues
in a variety of circumstances. In regards to malicious context, the obvious
shortcoming of dd is that a trivial (and malicious) modification of dd could
hide all traces of malware in volatile memory regardless of the size and com-
plexity of the malware. Many techniques like this are still quite suitable for
the majority of memory forensics, but the forensic analyst needs to be aware
of the possible shortcomings of their tools.
3.1.3 Lack of Permissions
Memory forensics is critical in very different situations, such as trying to
do forensics on a hostile machine. If the FBI or a comparable entity finds
a locked machine, they are faced with a dilemma. Traditionally, the ac-
cepted practice was to shut down the machine and scan drives oﬄine, but
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recent trends show increasing trends towards encrypting drives, and presum-
ably people targeted by such an organization would be attempting to protect
themselves. Without an encryption key, these drives have effectively random
data and are useless for any sort of investigation. In cases where the drive was
mounted, the encryption key would be somewhere in volatile memory. Al-
though the lack of permissions also complicates many of the simpler memory
acquisition techniques (dd included), many of the more advanced techniques
can circumvent this issue.
3.1.4 Internal Compromises
When an attack on an organization occurs from the inside (the attacker will
be referred to as the insider), there are a unique set of challenges to the
forensic acquisition process. In a similar case to lacking permissions, the
machines used by the insider may have been locked down or tampered by
leveraging legitimate permissions that he or she may have had. Additionally,
the insider could install malicious software to hide their existence, similar to
the situation mentioned in Hostile context. Some tools that might be effective
in one of the situations will be ineffective when both of the challenges are
present together.
3.1.5 Critical Nature of Systems
There are many systems that simply cannot afford downtime. While one
could use tools such as dd to capture memory, they would be faced with
issues with both memory quality and hostile context. This facet of volatile
memory forensics imposes a unique set of challenges for tools in that they
have to minimize or eliminate downtime altogether. While pausing a system
(either by taking control or using a hardware/software technique to suspend
normal execution) is an option for many circumstances, pausing long enough
for even a memory dump can be too much in a critical systems environment.
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3.1.6 Presence or Absence of Infrastructure
In a system where forensic analysis is desired, there are many techniques
that can be applied beforehand to simplify the situation. While obviously
not without tradeoffs, these techniques can be used to increase image qual-
ity, avoid hostile contexts, and reduce downtimes in cases of critical systems.
There exist a spectrum of options, ranging from choices of hardware, to spe-
cial software implementations, to the creation and use of specialized hardware
to aid in forensic efforts (although trivial to reason about, none appears to
be publicly available).
3.2 Analysis
In a completely different domain than acquisition, analysis also poses a
unique set of challenges. The context of how the dump is captured, the
operating system, and many other factors complicate what is already a diffi-
cult challenge. While many tools have emerged to simplify this process, they
all have their shortcomings and leave something to be desired.
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CHAPTER 4
A SURVEY OF MEMORY
In order to understand what one can expect to find in memory, it is useful to
be able to quantify the lifespan of objects in memory. Secondly, this lifespan
and how often objects are written to give us a quantitative understanding of
how significant the effects of blurriness might be.
4.1 Cafegrind
We created a tool called Cafegrind[14], which is created to quantify many of
the characteristics of memory. We ran Cafegrind on a variety of applications.
4.1.1 Design
Cafegrind is an extension to Valgrind[19], a C and C++ memory debugging
tool. It has a virtualized processor and already incorporates debugging sym-
bols of the programs it executes. Cafegrind extends Valgrind’s handling of
debugging symbols to infer the types of data structures for every memory
access. We collect the following data for each access.
1. Type - The type of an object
2. Object Size - The size of an object
3. Age - The length of time an allocation lasts before it is deallocated
4. FreedAge - The length of time a deallocated structure lasts before it is
clobbered by a subsequent allocation
5. Reads - Number of reads performed
6. Writes - Number of writes performed
7. Allocation Size - Size of the allocation including slack
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4.2 Life Cycle of Data
The life-cycle of data in a program is shown in Figure 1. First, memory is
allocated by using a function such as malloc() or new and it is then initialized
by a function such as memset(), C++ constructor or memory pool construc-
tor. Once the base object is ready, its fields are populated with information
and the data structure is accessed and modified as the program runs. Once
the data structure is no longer needed, it is freed and its memory returns
to a pool for reallocation. Throughout this process, memory locations can
be overwritten by modification, initialization and reallocation. However, the
process of relinquishing memory does not always clear the latent contents of
the data structure. In many cases, data is only partially destroyed as reuse of
a memory area does not always completely overwrite old data. This partial
destruction process is one of the underlying principles behind volatile mem-
ory forensic analysis and is useful in uncovering freed data. Cafegrind uses
empirical methods to track how much data can be recovered from memory
dumps that contain both active and freed data.
Figure 4.1: The lifecycle of data
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4.3 Results
We ran the popular Firefox web browser in Cafegrind to observe how long ob-
jects lasted in memory. This gives us a probabilistic idea of what data types
we would find in a memory dump with Firefox and an idea how significant
the effects of blurriness might be.
Figure 4.2: Firefox: Object age histogram
Figure 4.2 shows a histogram of the distribution of object ages. Many of
the objects allocated by Firefox have a long lifespan. This is likely to be the
case because Firefox uses a custom allocator and smart pointers.
Figure 4.3 shows how long freed objects last in memory before they are
ultimately reallocated and clobbered. There seem to be three distinct clus-
ters representing long-term, medium-term and short-term reallocations. This
behavior is reflective of how the memory allocator redistributes memory.
Smaller allocations are more frequent and therefore, the longevity of their
data is also shorter because these smaller memory pools are heavily used.
Larger allocations tend to be more rare and thus latent data has a longer life
expectancy in these pools. However, if the system is running low in mem-
13
Figure 4.3: Firefox: Freed age vs size
ory, larger pools can be split and reallocated to service requests for smaller
allocations.
Figure 4.4 interpolates all this data into one image.
More details can be found in the Cafegrind paper[14] and much more
detailed quantitative analysis can be found in Ellick Chan’s thesis[12]
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Figure 4.4: Firefox: Freed age vs Age
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CHAPTER 5
MEMORY ACQUISITION
In order to do memory forensics, first and foremost, one needs a source of
memory dumps. In practice, acquisition of memory dumps often seem to be
done in a very ad-hoc fashion. Usage of the UNIX tool dd in conjunction
with a portable medium (such as a thumb drive) or netcat seems to be
commonplace. Although these memory dumps are not of perfect quality due
to the memory footprint of the dd tool and temporal effects of a attempting
to make a copy of an actively changing system, we suspect in practice, due
to the quantity of memory in modern systems, the differences between these
memory dumps and the perfect case will be small. That being said, many
tools exist offering a variety of advantages over dd.
5.1 Forenscope
Forenscope [13] offers a very unique set of tradeoffs for memory acquisition
(as well as a variety of other functionality). Forenscope uses a technique
called memory remanence to get the machine running in a forensically stable
state (changes aren’t made to disk or memory) in order to acquire dumps or
perform analysis. The principle behind memory remanence is that memory
is basically a bank of capacitors which can retain their charge for a period of
time after being powered off. The duration of remanence depends on a variety
of factors including the type and density of the RAM and the temperature
of the chips.
In relatively modern systems (Forenscope was tested on a 00’s system)
memory remanence is long enough for memory to survive a reboot. As a
result of this, a forensic investigator can power a machine off and back on
again, boot of an external media (CD drive, USB key, etc), and load a min-
imal forensic OS which resides entirely in conventional memory (the first
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640kB, which is unused in the operation of modern OSes). At this point, the
machine is running in a state where it cannot be affected by malware, won’t
taint extended memory (everything past the 640kB of conventional memory),
and can capture memory without worrying about blurriness.
Forenscope then is able to reconstruct the state of the machine and restore
operation. This is due to the fact that the stack and running processes are
stored in memory, registers can be restored, and
5.2 Inception
Inception [3] is a bus-based memory hacking tool. It operates over Firewire,
Thunderbolt, PCI/PCIe, and other similar interfaces. These interfaces use
buses, which allow for direct memory access. Inception is a tool that basically
just presents a simple interface to these buses, which allows one to trivially
read or write to memory while a system is operational. The logical extension
of this is to use one of these interfaces to simply capture the contents of
memory. Blurriness is a concern due to the fact the system is operating
during the dump.
5.3 Virtual Machines
There are numerous virtual machine(VM) implementations. Popular solu-
tions include QEMU[4], Xen[11], and Virtualbox[5]. Virtual machines have
the advantage that the can work from outside the context of the guest OS,
can pause the VM so there are no issues with blurriness, and are able to
circumvent the issue of taint. Additionally, the VM can simply be resumed
and operation can continue. Virtual machines still have drawbacks, for ex-
ample if the host OS or virtual machine monitor are infected, the dump can
definitely be subverted and the tradeoffs associated with stopping execution
are still present.
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5.4 Inception + Agent
In addition to the ability to read from memory, the buses allow one to write
to memory as well. Using inception to write the binary of a small program
to memory (preferably in conventional memory to minimize taint to rele-
vant sections), one can exit the normal context of the system. This would
pause the system as to prevent blurriness, prevent malicious applications
from subverting the dump, and could restore execution using the resuscita-
tion mechanisms from Forenscope.
5.5 Hardware Support
Wang et al [21] created a system leveraging a network card with custom
firmware and System Management Mode (SMM) to acquire the contents of
memory. The network card can simply use the PCI interface to access the
contents of memory. SMM offers quite a few advantages over just using
DMA. SMM code can be locked so it isn’t accessible my malware on the
computer and beyond that, it can also find the values of registers. Wang also
creates an online memory analysis using SMM and a serial port to provide
an interface for GDB.
5.6 Custom Hardware
While Wang’s work provided quite a few advantages over software based
methods, implementing some sort of custom hardware solution could do much
more for the problem. If a hardware solution were created to capture memory,
it could be done securely and without taint, blurriness, or interrupting the
system. A simple implementation could be having a fully duplicated set
of RAM which mirrors the active RAM. When a dump is needed, the main
RAM would continue to operate as normal, but the mirrored ram would hold
the value from when it was prompted for the dump.
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CHAPTER 6
VISUALIZATION
6.1 Acquiring Memory
In order to analyze the contents of memory, first and foremost, one needs
a source of memory dumps. Obviously, we had quite a number of options
available to us to capture memory. To test and run our tools, we wanted
the highest quality dumps possible, so minimizing taint and blurriness was
paramount. Options like Forenscope[13] were considered, but the use of these
tools would be too time consuming or complex to capture the quantity of
memory dumps we required. In the end, we chose the software VirtualBox [5]
to virtualize our system and collect memory dumps. Like most virtualization
setups, it allows for a variety of useful functionalities, including snapshots,
stop/start/pause/resume, memory capture (specifically referenced as a ”core
dump”), and more. Functionality like snapshotting will be particularly useful
when we want to explore how different specific application states affect our
model of the application. VirtualBox was selected over a handful of other
virtualization options due to is compatibility, ease of memory capture, and
ease of use.
6.2 Application Heap Extraction
Now that we have access to high quality memory dumps, the next step is to
extract information specific to the applications. The three largest and most
relevant sources of information about an application are the heap, stack, and
code segment. Beyond this, there is a variety of application context managed
by the operating system, but we don’t expect this to be robust enough to
contribute much to our model. It does however provide useful functionality
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for finding and identifying our targets (the heap, stack, and code segment)
in memory.
6.2.1 Volatility
The Volatilty Framework is a set of tools used to extract various forms of in-
formation from memory images (or samples of memory images). It’s strength
lies heavily in the fact that it is able to support memory dumps from an
incredible variety of systems. It has profiles created for many flavors of Win-
dows and Mac OSX and a number of Linux distributions as well. Additional
Linux distributions are also easily supported as the profile is made up from
configuration files and files created from building the kernel.
6.2.2 Heap and Virtual Memory
We created a profile for our target virtual machine and use Volatility to
extract the pages from the heap related to our application. Some applications
had multiple processes, many of which had heaps of their own; however, one
of those heaps was often significantly larger, so we used only the largest heaps
in these cases.
6.3 Heap Analysis
Once we have an application’s heap memory specifically isolated and mapped,
we need to analyze it to make useful observations. The first thing to acknowl-
edge is that the heap is going to have noise. Due to the nature of how malloc
works, there will be pieces of freed data, malloc padding, and worse, unini-
tialized data in the pages we capture that make up the heap. While freed
memory can be invaluable for finding specific data fragments, it provides an
obstacle for someone using heap data for identification.
At this point it was important to discern the structure of the memory we
were trying to observe. We explored the memory space to find all the pointers
and looked for structures made up of multiple pointers. We looked for circular
links, long chains, and other patterns indicating common structures. We
also tracked invalid pointers (pointers which point to data outside of the
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stack) and misaligned pointers. There are a handful of things one wants to
take into consideration however. We acknowledge that there could be some
memory within the pages mapped to our processes which may be irrelevant
to the application we are targeting, but we believe this should not impose a
significant enough difference to affect our ability to classify various aspects
of applications. Additionally, we were concerned that there would be lots of
pointers pointing between the stack and heap, but fortunately that didn’t
seem to be too much of an issue in practice.
6.3.1 Pointer Visualization
While trying to understand what these structures looked like, we envisioned
various chains, loops, etc of pointers; however, we were not confident in how
these chains were connected or how many existed. We needed to create
meta-structures to represent the structures the pointers made in memory,
but we weren’t sure of the best way to do this. These meta-structures would
be used to train machine learning tools to later identify the states of an
application, but we did not have a good idea of what characteristics were
most important. The idea to visualize the structure came up and became
a good intermediate point to do some evaluation. The fundamental idea is
simple, each green dot represents a pointer. If the dot isn’t connected to
something, that pointer is pointing either to itself or to something that is
not a pointer. If the dot is connected to another dot, the pointer is pointing
to the pointer represented by the second dot. Linked list structures appear
as long lines of singly connected dots. Circularly linked lists or other looped
structures will create loops. Balls are also common (lots of dots connected
to a single dot) and represent when many pointers point to a single pointer.
More complex structures will utilize multiple combinations of these shapes.
While developing our tools, we looked at a handful of applications as well
as developing our own. We wrote a simple application that utilized linked
lists and behaved deterministically. The specific numbers are not interesting,
but it behaves exactly as expected and the numbers and visualizations match
up with the intended behavior. Some of the more interesting ones were initd,
rsyslogd, and udev, which we will discuss briefly below.
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6.3.2 Example Application: initd
Initd is the first application started by the kernel at boot. All other applica-
tions are children of initd and it is utilized in a wide variety of functionality
including the handling of orphaned processes. We captured the memory im-
age from our virtual machine shortly after opening an application. We used
volatility to extract all the pages related to initd. In total, we had 85 pages,
which accounts for 348,160 bytes, or 348kb. We identified 21,643 pointers,
which take up 173,144 bytes of data, or about 49.7% of the total memory
used by initd’s pages. Of these pointers, 17,852 pointers (or about 82% of all
pointers) have cyclical dependencies, and account for about 41% of the total
memory space of initd. 1622 pointers (7.5%) point to invalid pages (likely
references to the stack or code segment) or are not properly aligned. 3549
pointers, (16%) are involved in longer chains of pointers. Some pointers were
repeated. A visualization of these pointers can be seen in figure 6.1.
Initd had many pointers, so we can only see a subset of those in the
visualization. We can see many small chains of two or three pointers, but
there are also a good handful of longer chains as well as many loops.
Figure 6.1: Subset of the pointer structure of initd
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6.3.3 Example Application: rsyslogd
Rsyslogd is an application that centralizes the systems logging. It can take
a variety of inputs, such as TCP, file, klog, and others, and output to shell,
various database formats, various file abstractions, and more. Figure 6.2
shows the pointer structure of rsyslogd.
The visualization of rsyslogd offers a nice contrast to that of initd. While
initd had many small structures, it seems the majority of pointers in rsyslogd
are involved in one very large structure. Rsyslogd also has a good number
of ball pointer structures, something absent from initd. Loops are absent in
rsyslogd however.
Figure 6.2: Pointer structure of rsyslogd
23
6.3.4 Example Application: udev
Udev is the device manager for Linux. It handles /dev as well as adding/removing
of devices and loading firmware. Figure 6.3 shows the pointer structure of
udev.
Like rsyslogd, udev lacks loops, but like initd, it has a lot of small struc-
tures. It does have an interesting double-ball structure, but lacks any addi-
tional balls.
Figure 6.3: Pointer structure of udev
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CHAPTER 7
VISUALIZATION OF CHROMIUM
Chromium is a web browser developed by Google, which is the open source
version of the popular Chrome web browser (it lacks a few of the media and
other functionalities of chrome). As of March 2014, usage of Chrome ac-
counted for approximately 43% of worldwide usage of web browsers, which
makes it the most popular browser in the world. As we had mentioned pre-
viously, many applications have multiple processes. Chrome is no exception
to this, and has 7 unique PIDs, of which 5 have heaps. One of the processes’
heaps usually has considerably more pages than the other processes with
heaps. Our analysis focuses on only the heap from those PIDs. As our num-
bers will show, there are enough differences in the memory objects, that just
this one heap is enough to show differences between several memory dumps
of Chromium in a variety of states.
7.1 Inital Chromium Evaluation
Our initial tests of Chromium involved starting the browser, opening a variety
of tabs, and taking a memory snapshot. The analysis with Volatility yielded
5,311 pages, for a total of 21,244kb of data. This includes 68,290 pointers,
which have the following characteristics:
• pointers not found in the collection after few traversals: 61
• pointers in a linked list with data at the: 5,959
• pointers which have data immediately: 33,629
• pointers which are not 8 byte aligned: 2,006
• pointers in a linked list and pointing to non-aligned pointer: 78
25
• pointers which are pointing to themselves: 5,721
• pointers which point to a partial circularly link list: 140
7.2 Visual Analysis of Chromium Tab State
After our initial visualization, we proceeded to take quite a number of mem-
ory dumps outlining a variety of behaviors in Chromium. We experimented
with a variety of tabs, windows, general web, and video content.
For this evaluation, we simply opened the browser and took a dump with-
out doing anything. We opened incrementally more tabs (1-5, 10, 25) and
took a memory dump after each instance. None of these tabs had any con-
tent open, as we just wanted to see if we could quantify and/or visualize the
different number of tabs between the snapshots. In Figure 7.1 we have simply
opened Chromium and taken a memory dump. Figure 7.2 shows Chromium
after 25 tabs have been opened.
For our two tab visualizations, it is interesting how definitively there ap-
pears to be a visual difference between these two instances. In the one tab
instance, there are a handful of large balls in a sea of linear structures;
however, in the twenty five tab instance, there are many small balls (we’re
assuming there would be 25 if some were not cropped). It seems that the
number of balls is definitely proportional to the number of tabs open.
7.3 Quantitative Analysis of Chromium Tab State
For these tests, we will look at memory dumps taken for Chromium when 2,
3, 4, and 10 tabs (with no content) are open. As you can see in Figure 7.3,
we have a good mix of both types of pointers that have consistent numbers
across varying amounts of tabs as well as types of pointers that scale with
the number of tabs.
First, looking at total pointers, its interesting to observe that each tab
correlates approximately 10k additional total pointers. The pointers just go-
ing to data increase proportionally, but do not show such a simple numerical
increase. Its interesting to see that all the numbers related to circles and
partial circles do not seem to be affected though.
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Figure 7.1: Chromium with one tab open
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Figure 7.2: Chromium with 25 tabs open
Figure 7.3: Some data for various numbers of tabs
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CHAPTER 8
FUTURE WORK
There are many extensions to consider for our work. The original vision
for the project involved training classifiers to identify when a program is
behaving outside of normal parameters, akin to anomaly detection. Anomaly
detection techniques are typically far more costly than signature detection
in terms of computing resources, and our work is no exception to this. Just
extracting the pointer structure from one instance of Chrome takes several
hours.
One important thing to note is while our tools are implemented for a Linux
environment, there are no parts of our technique that should not work in a
Windows or Mac OSX environment. Volatility has very good support for
those systems, and especially considering the flexibility of python, our tool
chain should be adaptable with minimal effort.
One potential concern would be the classification accuracy of our tool and
its ability to discern small changes in an application. We strongly believe that
with sufficient training, changes should be evident in both smaller programs
(where the change would obviously have a larger effect) and larger programs
(where it would likely be easier to hide). We believe using the structure of
the objects in memory should provide more granularity than just the data
structures, and Cozzie et al. [16] was quite successful isolating the storm
malware even though it was only through observing changes in services.exe.
While the computational costs of our tool are large, we think the rewards
would be worthwhile. There are many attacks that go undetected for sig-
nificant periods of time. Stuxnet, despite being one of the largest instances
of malware ever discovered, existed for nearly a year undetected [8]. Flame,
the largest known instance of malware, went undetected several times longer
[10]. The important thing to consider is that both Stuxnet and Flame had
infected systems for many months or years before actually damaging any
systems. If a weekly test had caught one of them early on, the (suspected
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[7]) damage to a thousand centrifuges could have been averted.
Another thing to consider is that the cost of training a classifier is very
high, especially so if version changes of the application exhibit significant
differences in the heap structures. It may require full duplication for every
version of the application, which could admittedly be quite expensive. For-
tunately, most Linux systems are trending towards larger, more monolithic
releases.
We feel our tools would be particularly useful in a variety of specialized
environments. Ideal targets would be environments that have lots of head-
less machines or embedded systems, such as the power grid, where machines
typically only run a few versions of a small set of software. The computation
costs of profiling the software running on these machines would be low due to
the smaller set of appropriate hardware. Additionally, user installations and
modifications would be much rarer, so false positives which would stem from
upgrades and configuration changes would also be much less of a concern.
Machines (even user workstations) that adhere to strict policy would also be
good targets. The strict policy would likely simplify the breadth of applica-
tions and versions which require training, making the cost of implementing
our techniques lower.
There are many things to consider moving forward. While we found good
results just from the heap, it should be obvious that much more information
can be obtained by also examining the stack and code segment.
8.1 Stack Analysis
The stack is likely to differ from the heap in a variety of ways. The stack
frame will be set up and torn down many times, and as a result, the data here
is likely to be much more volatile. While the heap mostly contains structures
that are some degree of pervasive, the stack is likely to contain data that is
much shorter lived. The stack will also provide additional context to that
data. As one would walk down through frames of the stack, one could observe
what structures in the stack, heap, and code segment are tied to each stack
frame. The various frames of the stack could be used to create some sort of
structure that would provide additional insight into the data and pointers
found in the stack and heap.
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8.2 Code Segment Analysis
There is no shortage of data in the code segment. Every application has a
number of libraries. Sometimes these libraries are built statically when the
code is compiled. The result of this is that every application using these
libraries will have its own copies of those libraries. The other possibility is
that the libraries are built dynamically, which would result in a variety of dif-
ferent applications sharing some of the pages containing these libraries. We
could potentially model what some of these libraries look like and identify
what libraries and even possibly what versions of libraries various applica-
tions are using. While obviously not always present, when available, debug
information could provide quite a bit of insight as well.
Beyond this, with insight into the instruction pointer and other registers
(which should be stored in-memory for context switches and therefore avail-
able in memory), one could conceivably play or rewind a small bit of execution
(obvious barriers include i/o, interrupts, etc).
8.3 Further Heap Analysis
We have found some basic structure from tracing the pointers in the heap,
but there is still more we could do. There are plenty of statistics which could
be used for creating a stronger model context.
In addition to structural pointer analysis and visualization, there is more
insight into the form of data in the heap. For the non-pointer data in the
heap, the number of consecutive non-pointer blocks of memory could indicate
useful information. There are also techniques which try and infer what type
of data various binary data is, but it has traditionally been less than ideally
reliable in most cases, with the exception being the identification of strings.
8.4 Further Language and Application Targets
Before diving into the behaviors of Chrome, we only looked at a few other
basic applications to test out the functionality of our tool. We would have
loved to explore several more applications, in particular applications that do
their own memory management, such as Firefox and or applications written
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in languages with managed memory, such as Java. It would be particularly
interesting to see how those structures compare to applications written in
C/C++. The variation between languages would be interesting to observe.
It is our suspicion that the very large clusters seen in Chrome and Midori
are due to C++’s implementation of vtables. We wouldn’t expect non object
oriented languages to exhibit this behavior.
8.5 Malware Identification
The original goal of our tool was to use applications memory to classify the
normal behavior of the application. The output of our tools (and some of
the other suggested future works) will be a map of the structures in the ap-
plications. This component would use these maps to train a set of classifiers.
The classifiers would be used periodically to detect if applications running on
a system fall outside the normal functionality of that application and sound
the necessary alerts if it is in violation. This is an extremely complex task
as there are a variety of factors that can change the memory profile of an
application.
8.5.1 Malware Changes
In order to do their malicious activity, malware has to modify the infected
application in some way. This could include loading additional libraries or
adding hooks to the program API or functions. For example, Stuxnet infects
the Step 7 executable by injecting it with a malicious .dll (dynamic linked
library) and modifies the necessary Windows files to ensure it persists through
a reboot [9]. A memory dump of the Step 7 executable would certainly
contain traces of these modifications.
8.5.2 Benign Changes
There are many legitimate reasons an application could have a slightly or
even significantly changed memory profile. While small patches might only
result in slight changes, a new version of the program could have considerably
different characteristics, and many programs now incorporate regular updates
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for security. Many applications also include options to extend functionality
with plugins or add-ons, all of which would result in an expanded memory
profile.
8.5.3 Classification of Changes
An elaborate tool would be able to avoid false positives for most benign
changes. Version changes, updates, and the installations of plugins or add-
ons are all predictable. An automated tool could trivially be configured to
profile the application after the benign changes were implemented.
8.5.4 Virtual Machine Introspection
As the popularity of the cloud continues to expand, the use of virtualized
environments continues to grow as well. This is an ideal environment for
memory forensics. On one level, this infrastructure makes it simple to cap-
ture memory dumps, but beyond this, there is even more available. Virtual
machine introspection builds off a lot of the technology underneath the vir-
tual machines and allows for fine grained access to memory. This could allow
for applications’ memory to be sampled individually without ever taking the
system oﬄine. It truly is an exciting time for memory forensics.
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CHAPTER 9
RELATED WORK
Traditional malware techniques are typically based on signature detection.
These techniques involve the concept of a signature, some sort of identify-
ing trait, code, or behavior which is tied to a specific instance of malware.
Conventional anti-virus software is typically just large lists of signatures and
processes to iterate through the files on the system looking for these sig-
natures. Anomaly detection is less common, and while signature detection
tries to identify malware, anomaly detection does something of the inverse.
Instead of identifying something, it instead tries to create an alert when
something isn’t as expected.
Without even taking the effectiveness of signature detection into account
in an ideal situation, there are two major flaws working against it. For
signature detection to work, there are two fundamental requirements which
must be met. First and foremost, the signature of the malware must be
known. Typically, an antivirus company or security firm (like VirusBlokAda
in the case of Stuxnet [1]) identifies a new piece of malware and reports
it. The developers of the various signature detection based tools then have
to create signatures and the users of the software need to download updates
containing those new signatures. In the case of malware that has not yet been
identified, unless it recycles code from other known viruses (sophisticated
malware would not do this), signature detection would not be able to detect
it. In addition to the inability to identify malware for which signatures have
not been created, signature detection tools need to be run in an environment
where they can see any infected files. Sophisticated malware often disrupts
the functionality of signature detection tools, either by the use of rootkits or
by disrupting the detection processes directly. Some work has been done to
scan systems from a safe context [18], but the majority of tools do not do
this.
In the realm of more advanced detection techniques, Cozzie et al. [16],
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actually use very similar techniques to what we are envisioning. They cre-
ated a tool named Laika, which also extracts data from memory dumps in
order to classify applications, but focuses on reconstructing the various data
structures that the application uses. We’re working to go beyond this and
explore the shape and structure of instances of these data structures during
execution. While our techniques are computationally much more expensive,
we believe this is a necessary cost to find previously unknown malware. Ad-
ditionally, Laika is constructed as a signature detection based system, where
our tool intends to be closer to anomaly detection.
Anomaly detection is based on the principal that there is some sort of
normal behavior. If various thresholds are crossed, it can reasonably be
assumed that something has been changed. This approach is often used to
discover the presence of attacks or malware. In practice, use of anomaly
detection seems to be focused on network based information [20]. Our work
hopes to instead look for anomalies in the memory objects of applications.
Our work looks at the structure of how data is used in the heap. This
is similar to shape detection, a technique for estimating the shape of data
structures, which had been explored in compilers and model checkers[15,
17]. Corbett [15] explores these techniques to reduce state models for model
checkers which examine concurrency bugs in parallelized Java applications.
Ghiya et al. [17] explore the detection of trees, linked lists, graphs, and other
structures for use in compilers.
35
CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSION
Given the fact that modern day antivirus techniques are struggling with
sophisticated malware, new techniques are required to continue to protect
systems from infection. Few techniques focus on finding infections in ap-
plications, and the application context we create will definitely aid in the
identification of unknown viruses like Step 7.
Regular signature based scans have become the norm, but that does not
account for viruses that have not been identified. Exploratory periodic scans
of critical infrastructure could have saved considerable time and resources in
cases like Stuxnet. Our tools create a new insight into the context of an appli-
cation’s memory and will help push state of the art to simplify identification
in the future.
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